Increasing competitive actions: a focus on technical data rights associated with non-commercial hardware items by Liedke, Eric J. & Simonis, Jeffrey D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2014-06
Increasing competitive actions: a focus on technical
data rights associated with non-commercial
hardware items
Liedke, Eric J.











JOINT APPLIED PROJECT 
 
 
INCREASING COMPETITIVE ACTIONS: A 
FOCUS ON TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS 





By:   Eric J. Liedke, and 
  Jeffrey D. Simonis 
June 2014 
 






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 






















REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2014 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
INCREASING COMPETITIVE ACTIONS: A FOCUS ON TECHNICAL DATA 
RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-COMMERCIAL HARDWARE ITEMS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Eric J. Liedke and Jeffrey D. Simonis 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This project reviewed the key laws and the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) current policies pertaining to competition and the 
acquisition of technical data rights, as it applies to non-commercial hardware items. Competition data from the U.S. Army TACOM  
Life Cycle Management Command FY12 Annual Competition Report (ACC-WRN report), along with several sole source 
justifications and approvals (J&As) were then reviewed to determine if the government’s lack of technical data rights impacted the 
buying command’s ability to competitively acquire non-commercial hardware items. 
After reviewing the “top ten” dollar value, non-competed contract actions awarded by the Army Contracting Command - Warren 
(ACC-WRN) site in fiscal year 2012 (FY12), it was determined that 70 percent cited lack of technical data rights as a key reason 
for not being able to compete those contracts. The total dollar value for all related FY 12 sole source contracts at TACOM was 
$1.21 billion (bn). The total dollar value for the top ten sole source contracts that were looked at was $765 million, which is 63 
percent of the total $1.21bn awarded. The high percentages of 70 percent and 63 percent show that a lack of technical data is a 
barrier to competition for TACOM and contributed to a high percentage of the total non-competed actions at the ACC-WRN site in 
FY12. In the three J&As that did not list a lack of technical data as a key reason for awarding a sole source contract, an “unusual 
and compelling urgency” was cited as the authority for contracting without providing for full and open competition. 
Based on this project’s findings, several recommendations were made to improve the state of competition within the DOD. Some 
of the recommendations include offering incentives to contractor and government personnel, creating commodity specific 
competition goals, and analyzing Business case analyses (BCAs) associated with major defense programs to assess the 
thoroughness, accuracy, and uniformity of the information provided.
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Better Buying Power, Competition, Technical data rights, Data management strategy, Competition in 
Contracting Act, Business case analyses, Competition advocate 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
79 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
INCREASING COMPETITIVE ACTIONS: A FOCUS ON 
TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-
COMMERCIAL HARDWARE ITEMS 
 
 
Eric J. Liedke, NH-3, United States Army 
Jeffrey D. Simonis, NH-4, United States Army 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  Eric J. Liedke 
 
   Jeffrey D. Simonis 
 
    
 
Approved by:  Michael Boudreau 
   Project Advisor 
 
   Pamela Demeulenaere 
   Associate Project Advisor 
 
 
   William R. Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
v 
INCREASING COMPETITIVE ACTIONS: A FOCUS ON 
TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-
COMMERCIAL HARDWARE ITEMS 
ABSTRACT 
This project reviewed the key laws and the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) current 
policies pertaining to competition and the acquisition of technical data rights, as they 
apply to non-commercial hardware items. Competition data from the U.S. Army TACOM  
Life Cycle Management Command FY12 Annual Competition Report (ACC-WRN 
report), along with several sole source justifications and approvals (J&As), were then 
reviewed to determine if the government’s lack of technical data rights impacted the 
buying command’s ability to competitively acquire non-commercial hardware items. 
After reviewing the “top ten” dollar value, non-competed contract actions 
awarded by the Army Contracting Command–Warren (ACC-WRN) site in fiscal year 
2012 (FY12), it was determined that lack of technical data rights was cited as a key 
reason  that 70 percent of those contracts could not be competed. The total dollar value 
for all related FY 12 sole source contracts at TACOM was $1.21 billion (bn). The total 
dollar value for the top ten sole source contracts that were looked at was $765 million, 
which is 63 percent of the total $1.21bn awarded. The high percentages of 70 percent and 
63 percent, respectively, show that a lack of technical data is a barrier to competition for 
TACOM and contributed to a high percentage of the total non-competed actions at the 
ACC-WRN site in FY12. In the three J&As that did not list a lack of technical data as a 
key reason for awarding a sole source contract, an “unusual and compelling urgency” was 
cited as the authority for contracting without providing for full and open competition.  
Based on the present project’s findings, several recommendations are made to 
improve the state of competition within the DOD. Some of the recommendations include 
offering incentives to contractor and government personnel, creating commodity-specific 
competition goals, and analyzing business case analyses associated with major defense 
programs to assess the thoroughness, accuracy, and uniformity of the information 
provided.    
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This project will present and review key laws and the Department of Defense’s 
(DOD) current policies pertaining to competition and the acquisition of technical data 
rights, as it applies to non-commercial hardware items. In particular, this project will 
concentrate on reviewing the policies applicable to contracting professionals and program 
managers responsible for managing and implementing strategies associated with a major 
defense acquisition program. This project will also establish some of the mandatory 
actions that federal acquisition professionals must take when buying goods and services 
to establish context for the reader.  
In addition to conducting the literature review discussed in the paragraph above, 
this project will review 2012 justification and approvals (J&As) processed by the Army 
Contracting Command—Warren (ACC-WRN). A sampling of these documents will be 
reviewed to identify the reason why each contracting action was permitted to be fulfilled 
on a sole source basis in lieu of being competitively acquired. Overall, the purpose of this 
review is to determine if the government’s lack of technical data rights is impacting the 
DOD’s ability to competitively acquire non-commercial hardware items. 
The key sources of information used to complete this project include: several 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports pertaining to competition and 
technical data rights, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), Title 10 U.S.C 2320 
and 2321, sections of the Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.01 and 
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, sections of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 
data from an ACC-WRN annual competition report, and information from J&As 
applicable to the contracts sampled in this project.  
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B. BACKGROUND 
The government’s practice of acquiring goods and services on a competitive basis 
is not a new requirement. In fact, according to a report entitled Competition in Federal 
Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Requirements, Kate M. Manuel (2011) states:    
The federal government has promoted competition between offerors 
seeking to meet its needs since at least 1781, when the Superintendent of 
Finance advertised in a local newspaper for proposals from potential 
suppliers of food for federal employees in Philadelphia. (p. 2) 
Therefore, since at least 1781, the government has been committed to a practice of 
competitively acquiring goods and services. This practice has since been codified, 
changed, and continuously implemented through legislation, regulation, guides, manuals, 
and other forms of official documentation.  
However, despite the fact the government has an established practice and policies 
requiring its acquisition professionals to competitively acquire goods and services, 
sources such as the GAO have consistently identified in reports that the DOD could 
improve its ability to increase competition. In GAO report 10–833, entitled Federal 
Contracting: Opportunities Exist to Increase Competition and Assess Reasons When 
Only One Offer Is Received (Government Accountability Office, 2010), the GAO 
specifically identifies the DOD’s lack of access to technical data rights as a primary 
factor affecting its ability to competitively acquire items through the contracting process. 
This GAO finding seems to have been accepted by the DOD, considering the fact that the 
DOD’s own Better Buying Power (BBP) campaign includes a requirement for all 
program managers to develop open systems architectures and set rules for the acquisition 
of technical data rights. Specifically, Carter (2010) states:  
At Milestone B I will require that a business case analysis be conducted in 
concert with the engineering trade analysis that would outline an approach 
for using open systems architectures and acquiring technical data rights to 
ensure sustained consideration of competition in the acquisition of weapon 
systems. A successful example of the strategic use of open architecture 
and buying of appropriate technical data rights is the Navy’s Virginia-
class SSN program. The Virginia program uses a modular open systems 
architecture and selective sub-component technical data rights 
procurement that promotes a robust competition at the component supplier 
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level, while still supporting continual and effective block upgrades to the 
existing systems that reduce the overall life cycle cost of the system. 
(p. 10) 
Overall, the above requirement established by Dr. Ashton Carter, the former 
USD(AT&L), serves as evidence that the DOD agrees with the GAOs conclusions, and is 
trying to implement process improvements pertaining to technical data strategies that will 
improve its ability to execute more competitively sourced contracts in the future.  
C. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology behind this project is twofold. First, several key pieces of 
information will be reviewed in order to relate the necessary background information for 
the reader. The background information presented in Chapters II and III will provide the 
reader with both a historical and current day perspective of the laws and policies 
associated with the topics presented in this project. The literature that was reviewed to 
complete this project generally consisted of previously issued laws, regulations, guides, 
manuals, and GAO reports.  
In order to address this project’s research questions, contract data was extracted 
from the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command FY12 Annual 
Competition Report (ACC-WRN report). The data was not explicitly included in the 
ACC-WRN report, but it contained the raw information used by the command to prepare 
its annual competition report. From this data set, target contract actions were identified in 
accordance with the scope and limitation of this project. Once target actions were 
identified, read only access to the contract files was given by the ACC-WRN, and the 
relevant J&A documents were harvested in order to analyze the basis for pursuing an 
exception to competition. In addition, the ACC-WRN report was used to assess what type 
of local level competitive buying initiatives were promoted by the command.  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
As previously discussed, this project will review key acquisition laws and current 
DOD policies as they pertain to competition requirements and technical data rights 
associated with non-commercial hardware items procured by major defense acquisition 
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programs. This project will only focus on the technique of acquiring technical data rights 
as a means for creating competition. Therefore, it will not delve into the other techniques 
that are available to the government to obtain competition (e.g., form, fit, and function 
specifications, directed licensing, competitive copying). The scope of this project was 
limited to the technique of purchasing technical data rights by the government, primarily 
because it is the technique that has been specifically promoted by the BBP initiatives.  
As it relates to the data analysis portion of this project, the data used is limited to 
2012 contracting information that was generated and stored by the Army Contracting 
Command—Warren. Within this bank of contracting files, only approved J&As will be 
utilized to determine whether-or-not the lack of access to technical data caused the 
buying command to pursue sole source contracting procedures. Also, the number of 
J&As reviewed will be limited to the to the top ten ACC-WRN sole source actions made 
in 2012 with the highest associated dollar value, made on behalf of the programs of 
record located at the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) 
Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC). The purpose of limiting our review to just 
2012 redacted J&As is a matter of practicality (i.e., maintaining a manageable scope to 
this project), and it mitigates the chances of exposing sensitive information.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The two primary research questions addressed in this study are the following: 
 Does the government’s lack of technical data rights associated with 
hardware items, significantly impact DOD’s ability to competitively 
acquire non-commercial items? 
 Are there obvious changes that can be made to key statutes, regulations or 
other polices pertaining to technical data acquisition that would likely 
increase DOD’s ability to competitively acquire non-commercial items? 
Subsidiary research questions include:  
 What are the major laws, orders, guidance, and regulations that establish 
the government’s preference to buy items on a competitive basis?  
 What are the rationale and motives for establishing a system that 
emphasizes competitive contracting procedures? 
 What are some of the government’s current recommendations to increase 
its ability to procure items on a competitive basis?  
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 What type of programs is the TACOM LCMC employing to affect 
competition?  
F. ORGANIZATION BY CHAPTER 
Chapter II provides a background of the government’s history of acquiring items 
on a competitive basis, and identifies the current laws and regulations that influence the 
government’s contracting process. In particular, the general requirements of the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 and specific portions of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) will be reviewed, as they pertain to competition. 
Ultimately, this chapter will allow the reader to consider some fundamental principles 
that all government acquisition professionals must abide by and promote when it comes 
to the acquisition of supplies or services. It will also establish who within the acquisition 
workforce is largely responsible for establishing, executing and sustaining competitive 
acquisition strategies. Altogether, this information will allow the reader to understand 
both DOD’s history and current policy requirements applicable to competition in 
contracting.  
Chapter III will examine the DOD’s competition and technical data rights-related 
problems. This will be accomplished by summarizing the findings of several GAO 
reports, and discussing recent initiatives pursued by the DOD to establish effective long 
term competition strategies through the use of technical data rights and open 
architectures. This chapter will then outline some fundamental information that will help 
the reader understand the following: the definition of technical data, the definition of 
technical data rights, the key laws and regulations that govern technical data rights, who 
is responsible for establishing long term data right strategies, and at what point in the life 
cycle is it critical to establish the DOD’s rights. Ultimately, the information presented in 
this chapter will clarify for the reader to the DOD’s past and current policies, as they 
apply to technical data rights.  
Chapter IV will provide some general background information pertaining to the 
ACC-WRN. This portion of the project will assist the reader to understand the ACC-
WRN mission in terms of description and magnitude based on the range of DOD items it 
procures. Furthermore, this chapter will identify the Army Acquisition Programs that the 
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ACC-WRN supports. After this introductory information is given, statistical information 
from the ACC-WRN report presented, and then detailed information will be given about 
the particular contract file reviews that were conducted to execute this project. The 
information presented in this chapter will serve as the basis for the conclusions and 
recommendations drawn, which will be presented in Chapter V.  
As stated above, Chapter V will present the conclusions and recommendations, 
based on all of the information utilized to execute this project. This chapter will also 
provide the answers to the research questions presented in Chapter I, present some 
recommendations for further research, and present some competition initiatives the DOD 
may want to implement at the local level.  
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This project will identify and explore the key statutory and regulatory policies 
governing both competition and technical data rights, as they apply to the noncommercial 
hardware items. From this information, the reader will develop a working level 
knowledge on the subject, to include a fundamental understanding of definitions, 
processes, and roles and responsibilities of the government acquisition personnel.  
In addition this project will help to determine whether-or-not one of the Army’s 
largest life cycle management command’s ability to use competitive contracting 
procedures was hindered in 2012 by its lack of access to technical data rights. 
Furthermore, the ACC-WRN report will be used to determine what incentive programs 
and techniques to generate competition are being employed by the command. These 
findings will be brought to light, primarily to build awareness among the acquisition 
professionals who read this project.  
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II. COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter I, the practice of acquiring goods and services on a 
competitive basis can be traced back to 1781. However, it was not until 1809 that 
Congress passed the first law requiring competition in federal procurement contracting. 
Congress has since passed several statutes further affecting competition in the federal 
acquisition process. As documented in her report, Competition in Federal Contracting: 
An Overview of the Legal Requirements, Kate M. Manuel (2011) provided the following 
timeline and description of the key statutes, policies, and recommendations from 
Congress affecting competition over the years:  
 1809: Congress passes the first law requiring competition in Federal 
procurement contracting. This law established what came to be known as 
“formal advertising” as the preferred method for Federal procurements by 
specifying that “all purchases and contracts for supplies or services … 
shall be made by open purchases, or by previously advertising for 
proposals.” (2 Stat. 536 (1809)). 
 1861: Congress reaffirms its commitment to formal advertising by passing 
a statute stating that “all purchases and contracts for supplies and services, 
... except for personal services, ... shall be made by advertising a sufficient 
time previously for proposals respecting the same” unless immediate 
delivery is required due to “public exigencies.” (12 Stat. 220 (1861)). 
 1914–1918: The War Industries Board authorizes negotiated 
procurements, or procurements involving bargaining with the offerors 
after receipt of proposals. Such procurements are classified as 
noncompetitive. 
 1930: The War Policies Commission recommends that formal advertising 
be replaced by negotiated procurement during times of war. Congress does 
not enact this proposed change, but does recognize additional exceptions 
allowing use of negotiated procurement instead of formal advertising. 
 1939–1945: In December 1941, Congress passes the First War Powers 
Act, which authorizes the President to grant agencies that are “involved in 
the war” authority to enter into contracts “without regard to the provision 
of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modifications 
of contracts.” (55 Stat. 838 (1941)). Later in the war, the War Production 
Board prohibits agencies from using formal advertising without specific 
authorization to do so. 
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 1945: A task force of the Procurement Policy Board, consisting of officers 
from the Federal procuring agencies, recommends relaxing competition 
requirements to support the growth and sustainability of the industrial 
base. 
 1947: Congress passes the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA), 
which generally requires use of formal advertising but allows use of 
negotiated procurements when any of seventeen exceptions apply. These 
exceptions address things such as medicines or medical property; property 
purchased for authorized resale; perishable or nonperishable subsistence 
supplies; and property or services for which it is impracticable to secure 
competition. ASPA only applies to the procurement contracts of defense 
agencies. 
 1949: Congress passes the Federal Property and Administrative Services 
Act (FPASA), subjecting civilian agencies to requirements like those in 
ASPA. FPASA recognizes fifteen exceptions to formal advertising. 
 1982: Senators William V. Roth, Jr., Carl Levin, and William S. Cohen 
first introduce the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) (S. 2127). 
Increased competition in contracting is also among the “Carlucci 
Initiatives,” 32 steps for reforming defense acquisitions announced by then 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. 
 1984: Congress passes CICA, requiring agencies to obtain “full and open 
competition through the use of competitive procedures” in their 
procurement activities unless otherwise authorized by law. 
 1990–1991: Military agencies experience difficulties in procuring 
commercial items for use during the Gulf War. In one high-profile 
incident, the Air Force’s attempt to purchase $10 million worth of 
commercially available mobile radios for the troops falls through because 
the supplier, Motorola, is not used to dealing with the Government and 
does not have a Government-approved cost-accounting program in place 
to justify its price. Motorola sells the radios to Japan, which gives them to 
the Air Force. 
 1994: Congress passes the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), 
which establishes a “preference” for the acquisition of commercial items 
in meeting agencies’ procurement needs. FASA also articulates 
competition requirements for task order and delivery order (TO/DO) 
contracts. 
 1996: Congress passes the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA), 
which requires that agencies “obtain full and open competition ... in a 
manner that is consistent with the need to efficiently fulfill the 
Government’s requirements.” FARA also relaxes the rules imposed on 
agencies’ purchases of commercial items. 
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 2003: Congress passes the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA). 
SARA further relaxes the rules imposed upon procurement of commercial 
services. 
 2008: Section 843 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 
limits the use of single-award task order/delivery order (TO/DO) contracts 
in excess of $100 million; grants GAO temporary jurisdiction over 
protests involving orders of $10 million or more; and specifies what 
constitutes a “fair opportunity to be considered” for orders in excess of $5 
million. 
 2009:	 On	 March	 4,	 2009,	 President	 Barack	 Obama	 issued	 a	
memorandum	 to	 all	 contracting	 personnel	 reminding	 them	 of	 their	
overall	obligation	to	the	American	taxpayer.	In	his	memorandum,	the	
President	specifically	stated	that,	“Since 2001, spending on Government 
contracts has more than doubled, reaching over $500 billion in 2008. 
During this same period, there has been a significant increase in the 
dollars awarded without full and open competition and an increase in the 
dollars obligated through cost-reimbursement contracts. Between fiscal 
years 2000 and 2008, for example, dollars obligated under cost-
reimbursement contracts nearly doubled, from $71 billion in 2000 to $135 
billion in 2008. Reversing these trends away from full and open 
competition and toward cost-reimbursement contracts could result in 
savings of billions of dollars each year for the American taxpayer. 
(Manuel, 2011, pp. 4–5) 
The purpose of providing the summary above is to establish the fact that Congress 
has a longstanding history of promoting the use of competitive contracting procedures, 
but it also seems to relax this policy during wartime. However, today the president is 
promoting a policy of maximum competition utilization, even during wartime. Therefore, 
the topic is a very serious matter for the DOD to address, because it may be impossible 
for it to achieve the president’s objectives at time of war, unless current facets of the law 
and regulations change. Thus, the remaining portions of this chapter will discuss	 the	
requirements	of	 some	key	government	policies	pertaining	 to	 competition,	and	 the	
analysis	 performed	 will	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 acquisition	 or	 access	 to	
technical	data	is	lost	during	wartime.	 
B. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT 
Out of the laws outlined in paragraph A. above, this project focuses on the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 because it causes agencies to obtain full 
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and open competition through the use of competitive procedures unless an exception is 
otherwise authorized by law. CICA goes further by enumerating the specific rules for 
requiring agencies to obtain full and open competition. The requirements of this law are 
still intact today, and are promoted by DOD leadership as method for capitalizing on the 
potential cost savings commonly realized through competitive acquisitions. This 
campaign is evidenced by the BBP initiatives. No matter, CICA is the preeminent law 
governing competition and it was codified into United States Code Annotated, Title 10, 
Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 137, Section 2304. The shortened name of the codified law is 
10 U.S.C §2304, which is the current version as it stands today and is clearly reflected in 
DOD policy.  
As discussed above, CICA requires contracting	 officers	 to	 promote	 and	
provide	for	full	and	open	competition	when	soliciting	offers	and	awarding	contracts	
(10 U.S.C §2304) using contract methods to include sealed bids, competitive proposals, 
and other methods (such as described in Manuel’s (2011) Competition in Federal 
Contracting: An Overview). However, when an exception to competition is utilized, the 
contracting officer must justify the reason in writing prior to commencing negotiations. 
The contracting officer documents the authority to issue a sole source contract in a J&A, 
which per CICA must be approved by the appropriate official (dependent on the dollar 
amount of the contract) and needs to be based on one of the following seven statutory 
authorities:  
 There is only one responsible source and no other supplier or services will 
satisfy agency requirements. 
 There is an unusual and compelling urgency. 
 Industrial mobilization or an engineering, development, and research 
capability is needed, or expert services are required. 
 An international agreement or treaty is involved. 
 A specific statute authorizes or requires the use of noncompetitive 
acquisition procedures. 
 National security could be compromised. 
 It is not in the public’s interest regarding the particular acquisition 
concerned.  
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In addition to meeting one or more of the exceptions presented above, the J&A 
must contain sufficient facts and rationale to justify the use of the stated exception. Per 
FAR Subsection 6.303–2, most justifications must include the following information: a 
description of the agency’s needs, a determination that the anticipated cost will be fair 
and reasonable, a description of the market survey conducted or a statement of the 
reasons a market survey was not conducted, a listing of the sources (if any) that expressed 
in writing an interest in the procurement, and a statement of the actions (if any) the 
agency may take to remove or overcome any barrier to competition before a subsequent 
procurement for such needs. The accuracy and the completeness of the justification is 
ultimately concurred on by the contracting officer.  
C. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM–DODD DIRECTIVE 5000.01 
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) describes the management process the 
Department of Defense uses to provide effective, affordable, and timely systems to the 
users. DODD 5000.01 lays out specific policies and applies to all acquisition programs. 
An Acquisition Program is defined as a “directed, funded effort that provides a new, 
improved, or continuing materiel, weapon or information system, or service capability in 
response to an approved need” (Department of Defense, 2007, Section 3.2). The primary 
objective of defense acquisition is “to acquire quality products that satisfy user needs 
with measurable improvements to mission capability and operational support, in a timely 
manner, and at a fair and reasonable price” (Department of Defense, 2007, Section 4.2). 
Within the DAS, the program manager (PM) is the designated individual who has 
been given the responsibility and authority to accomplish program objectives for the 
development, production, and sustainment of material required to meet the user’s 
operational needs. Section 4 of DODD 5000.01 discusses many of the roles of a PM; 
however, two of his or her core responsibilities include the management of programs 
consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements and the need to establish program 
goals for the minimum number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters that 
describe the program over its life cycle. As the single point of accountability for 
accomplishing program objectives for total life-cycle systems management, including 
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sustainment, the DODD 5000.01 prescribes PMs to take a total systems approach when 
managing a program. The guidance further states that “the PM shall apply human systems 
integration to optimize total system performance (hardware, software, and human), 
operational effectiveness, and suitability, survivability, safety, and affordability” 
(Department of Defense, 2007, Section E1.1.29) and that  “PMs shall consider 
supportability, life cycle costs, performance, and schedule comparable in making 
program decisions” (Department of Defense, 2007, Section E1.1.29). In addition, the 
directive discusses that planning for operation and support and the estimation of total 
ownership costs shall begin as early as possible, and that supportability is a key 
component of performance, and needs to be considered throughout the system life cycle 
(Department of Defense, 2007)  
Additional policy is established in the DODD 5000.01 in regards to competition, 
discussing how competition can provide major incentives to industry and government 
organizations to innovate, reduce cost, and increase quality. Guidance is given, which 
states that all of the DOD components “shall acquire systems, subsystems, equipment, 
supplies, and services in accordance with the statutory requirements for competition” 
(Department of Defense, 2007, Section E1.1.3). The policy on competition further states 
how acquisition managers should take all necessary actions to promote a competitive 
environment. Some examples of these actions are to include the consideration of 
alternative systems to meet stated mission needs, structuring acquisition strategies to 
ensure the availability of competitive suppliers throughout a program’s life, ensuring that 
prime contractors foster effective competition for major and critical products and 
technologies; and ensuring that qualified international sources are permitted to compete. 
If competition is not available, PMs are directed to consider alternatives that will yield 
the benefits of competition (Department of Defense, 2007).  
Especially relevant to today’s operating environment, the DODD 5000.01 
discusses how all participants in the acquisition system should recognize the reality of 
fiscal constraints. Cost should be viewed as an independent variable, and programs 
planned based on realistic projections of the dollars and manpower likely to be available 
in future years. More guidance is given in the area of a program’s projected cost. 
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Specifically, the major cost drivers of a program’s projected overall life cycle cost should 
be identified early on so they can be managed from the onset of the program. In addition, 
the directive states that the user should address affordability in establishing capability 
needs (Department of Defense, 2007).   
D. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
The FAR is the primary regulation that establishes guidelines for federal 
executive agencies in the acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds. 
The FAR is the DOD’s primary method for implementing all laws, executive orders, and 
other directives into the acquisition process. It became effective on April 1, 1984, and 
was issued within applicable laws under several joint authorities of the government. The 
FAR provides for coordination, simplicity, and uniformity in the federal acquisition 
process.  
As defined in the FAR, “Full and open competition,” when used with respect to a 
contract action, means that all responsible sources are permitted to compete. Furthermore, 
“effective competition” is defined as a market condition that exists when two or more 
contractors, acting independently, actively contend for the government’s business in a 
manner that ensures that the government will be offered the lowest cost or price 
alternative or best technical design meeting its minimum needs (FAR Section 34.001).   
Per FAR Section 1.102, promoting competition can help satisfy the customer in 
terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service. The primary 
customers for the product or service are considered to be the end users (i.e., Soldiers) and 
program managers, who are operating and acting on behalf of the American taxpayer. 
This section of the FAR is important because it essentially reiterates the requirements of 
CICA by stating the policy of the federal government is to promote competition 
throughout the acquisition process, however, there are many other examples of 
requirements in the FAR that also seek to enact the intent of CICA. A small selection of 
such requirements is provided below to help the reader better understand some of the 
regulatory requirements that exist in order to further effect competition.  
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1. Exceptions for Allowing other than Full and Open Competition 
As previously discussed in this chapter, CICA allows contracting officers to use 
procedures other than full and open competition, however, in order to do so contracting 
professionals must obtain authority in accordance with the requirements established in 
FAR Subpart 6.3. Authorization to deviate from the use of competitive procedures must 
be provided for in a J&A, which is a document that includes all the facts needed to 
support the proposed exception to competition. Such facts commonly presented in a J&A 
include a discussion on the availability of a technical data package (TDP) or the 
government’s access to data rights, specifications, engineering descriptions, statements of 
work, or if purchase descriptions suitable for full and open competition have not been 
developed or are not available. In addition, the prescribed content of a J&A requires the 
preparer to address the market research conducted and actions taken to obtain 
competition. Overall, these documents are quite extensive, and require the contracting 
and acquisition professionals responsible for completing the document to provide 
thorough rationale for justifying the use of other than competitive procedures.  
2. Publicizing Proposed and Tracking Contract Actions  
Another competition-promoting requirement that agencies must satisfy is to 
publicize all proposed contracting actions using a single government-wide point of entry 
(GPE), which is located at fedbizopps.gov. This requirement, which must be satisfied by 
contracting officers, is established in FAR Section 5.002, and it states that the 
government-wide Point of Entry is “the single point where government business 
opportunities greater than $25,000, including synopses of proposed contract actions, 
solicitations, and associated information, can be accessed electronically by the public.” In 
addition to publicizing these types of notices, procuring agencies also use 
fedbizzopps.gov to publicize qualification requirements for systems if active competition 
on anticipated future requirements is likely to be fewer than two manufacturers. 
However, contracting officers are not required to publicize the qualification requirements 
if they determine that doing so could compromise national security (FAR Section 9.204). 
Regardless, as explained in FAR Part 5, one of the primary points for publicizing this 
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type of information is to facilitate competition and participation from industry, both at the 
prime and subcontractor or supplier levels (FAR Section 5.206).  
3. The Competition Advocate 
As required by Section 20 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, the 
head of each executive agency shall designate a competition advocate (CA) for the 
agency and for each procuring activity of the agency (FAR Section 6.501). Competition 
advocates are responsible for promoting full and open competition, and they generally 
accomplish their mission by utilizing the following methods: challenging requirements 
that are not stated in terms of functions to be performed, questioning the performance 
required or essential physical characteristics of an item, and helping to eliminate barriers 
to full and open competition caused by restrictive statements of work, unnecessarily 
detailed specifications, and unnecessarily burdensome contract clauses. Competition 
advocates must review the contracting operations of the agency and report to senior 
procurement executives any recent opportunities or actions taken to help meet the 
preceding responsibilities. Another key requirement the competition advocate must 
perform includes preparing and submitting an annual report to senior procurement 
executives of the agency. This report describes any new initiatives taken by the entity to 
increase competition, addresses other ways in which the agency has emphasized the 
acquisition of commercial items and competition in areas such as acquisition training and 
research, and includes recommended competition goals and plans for increasing 
competition in the upcoming fiscal year. Lastly, the report discusses ways to promote 
personal and organizational accountability, as they pertain to increasing competition. 
Personal and organizational accountability could include the use of recognition and 
awards to motivate program managers, contracting officers, and others in authority to 
promote competition in acquisition (FAR Section 6.502). 
4. Acquisition Planning 
Agencies must perform acquisition planning and conduct market research prior to 
executing a contract action. This requirement helps the acquisition team assess the overall 
market in relation to the item being bought. If conducted properly, this exercise provides 
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a significant amount of information back to the acquisition team, which heavily 
influences its prospective contracting strategy. One critical question the results of market 
research should answer is whether-or-not the item can be acquired competitively. In fact, 
FAR Part 7 says market research must be taken to obtain competition to the maximum 
extent practicable (FAR Section 7.102), and that the head of the agency needs to ensure 
acquisition planners address the requirement to specify needs, develop specifications, and 
to solicit offers in a way that helps promote and provide for full and open competition 
(FAR Section 7.103). Furthermore, Section 7.104 of the FAR also discusses “how” the 
acquisition planning team should consult with requirements and logistics personnel to 
determine type, quality, quantity, and delivery requirements. It also says the team should 
avoid issuing those requirements on an urgent basis or with unrealistic delivery or 
performance schedules because these factors generally restrict competition and cause 
prices to increase.  
In regards to the product these teams must create, DFARS Subsection 
207.103(d)(i)(B) states that an acquisition plan must be created and approved by the 
Agency-head for all production or services involving contract actions over $50 million 
for all years or $25 million for any one fiscal year. This plan, similar to some of the 
information presented in a J&A, must describe how competition will be sought, 
promoted, and sustained throughout the course of the acquisition. In accordance with 
FAR Section 7.105, if full and open competition is not contemplated, the authority in 
FAR Section 6.302 must be cited as well as the basis for the application of the authority, 
sources must be identified, and the reasons why full and open competition cannot be 
obtained must be discussed. In addition, the plan must also identify all major components 
and subsystems and describe how competition can be promoted for them. A focus also 
must be placed on how competition will be sought on the spares and repair parts of 
systems. In this area, key logistics milestones should be established, such as technical 
data delivery schedules and acquisition method coding conferences that affect 
competition.  
Acquisition plans also need to address whether or not subcontract competition is 
feasible and desirable and how it will be sought, promoted, and sustained throughout the 
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course of the acquisition. Any known barriers to subcontract competition must also be 
identified as well as ways to overcome them (ref. FAR Section 7.105). Contractors are 
required to select subcontractors and suppliers on a competitive basis to the maximum 
extent practical consistent with the objectives and requirements of the contract. 
Exceptions, however, are granted in this area if the contractor is an approved mentor 
under the Department of Defense Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program (Pub. L. 101–510, 
section 831 as amended). In this case, a contractor may award subcontracts on a 
noncompetitive basis to its protégés (FAR Subsection 52.244–5). 
5. Additional Requirements for Major Systems 
In addition to the standard considerations given to competition in the FAR, 
additional considerations are paid in respect to a major system. Per FAR Section 2.101, a 
major system is an item that consists of a combination of elements that will function 
together to produce the capabilities required to fulfill a mission need, and further defined 
as system for which the DOD is responsible and the total expenditures for research, 
development, test, and evaluation for the system are estimated to be more than  
$189.5 million or the eventual total expenditure for the acquisition exceeds $890 million. 
An example of a special consideration paid to major weapon systems is found in FAR 
Section 7.106, where it encourages acquisition teams to require potential offerors to 
include in their proposals ways to incorporate items that the government will be able to 
acquire competitively if they are likely to be needed in substantial quantities throughout 
the system’s service life. Contractors may then propose to the government the right to use 
technical data to be provided under the contract for competitive future acquisitions along 
with the associated cost for acquiring such data. In addition, proposals may include ways 
to achieve the qualification or development of multiple sources of supply for competitive 
future acquisitions (FAR Section 7.106). For major systems acquisition, the contracting 
officer shall require the delivery of any technical data relating to the major system that is 
developed exclusively with government funding, but only if the delivery of the technical 
data is needed to ensure the competitive acquisition of supplies or services that will be 
required in substantial quantities in the future (FAR Subsection 27.406–3). 
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Also, other policies designed to ensure agencies acquire major systems in the 
most effective, economical, and timely manner are given in FAR Section 34.002. This 
section states that agencies acquiring major systems should promote innovation and full 
and open competition (as required by FAR Part 6) in the development of major system 
concepts. This can be accomplished by expressing agency needs and major system 
acquisition program objectives in terms of the agency’s mission and not in terms of 
specified systems to satisfy needs, and by focusing agency resources and special 
management attention on activities conducted in the initial stage of major programs. 
Further guidance is given in FAR Subsection 34.005–1 where it states that the program 
manager shall promote full and open competition and sustain effective competition 
between alternative major system concepts and sources throughout the acquisition 
process, as long as it is economically beneficial and practicable to do so, and the notice of 
any proposed acquisition shall be given the broadest and most effective circulation 
practicable throughout the business, academic, and government communities.  
E. SUMMARY 
As one can clearly ascertain from the information presented in this chapter, the 
government has a history of procuring items and services on a competitive basis. It is also 
clear that Congress has enacted many laws that deal with competition in contracting; 
however, CICA is considered the most significant law because it made competition the 
required method of procurement (absent an approved exception). While the government 
does deserve some credit for increasing competitive spending overall, it still spends a 
significant amount of money on a noncompetitive basis (Obama, 2009).  
Therefore, in the upcoming chapters we will explore the topic of technical data in 
relation to competition. TACOM’s 2012 competition data will also be analyzed to 
determine if the government’s lack of access to technical data significantly impacted its 
competition goals. Lastly, recommendations to increase the government’s ability to 
acquire technical data right will be given.  
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III. TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As introduced in Chapter I of this project, the DOD acquisition community 
received guidance from Dr. Ashton B. Carter, the former USD(AT&L) on  June 28, 2010. 
This guidance introduced a government initiative called the Better Buying Power (BBP) 
Program, which promotes ways to increase efficiencies within the federal acquisition 
process. The BBP as introduced by Dr. Carter originally consisted of forty separate 
initiatives. Then, on November 13, 2012, Mr. Frank Kendall, the current USD(AT&L), 
issued a letter which grouped the initiatives into seven focus areas. Within these focus 
areas, one of the principles required acquisition personnel to promote effective 
competition by “enforcing (sic) open system architectures and effectively managing 
technical data rights” (Kendall, 2012). Therefore, this chapter will illustrate the DOD’s 
apparent problems associated with technical data rights. It will also provide definitions 
related to commonly used technical data rights terminology, examine the preeminent 
DOD technical data statute, and examine the DOD’s technical data policy and standard 
contract clauses.  
B. DOD’S REPORTED PROBLEMS WITH DATA RIGHTS  
Even though the DOD has established policies on competition in contracting and 
technical data, the fact remains that the DOD continues to struggle with the effective 
acquisition and management of technical data rights, which has negatively impacted its 
competitive spending rates. This has created a barrier to DOD’s ability to affect the levels 
of competitive spending it desires, as presented in President Obama’s 2009 memorandum 
and the BBP initiatives. This barrier is significant and is supported by the findings of 
several GAO audits conducted on the matter. To further illustrate this problem, some of 
the findings and concluding statements from recent GAO reports are provided below:  
1. GAO report 06–839, entitled Strengthen Policies for Assessing Technical Data 
 Needs to Support Weapon Systems (Findings are directly quoted, in a through c, 
 below.)  
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a. DOD acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term 
needs for technical data rights to sustain weapon systems over their life 
cycle, and in absence of a DOD-wide policy, the Army and the Air Force 
are working independently to develop structured approaches for defining 
technical data requirements and securing rights to those data. 
b. DOD acquisition policies do not specifically require program 
managers to assess long-term needs for technical data rights or develop 
corresponding acquisition strategies. Army and Air Force are working to 
develop structured approaches for assessing technical data needs and 
securing long-term rights to those data. 
c. Under current DOD acquisition policies, the military services lack 
assurance that they will have the technical data rights needed to sustain 
weapon systems throughout their life cycle. We have previously made 
recommendations that DOD enhance its policies regarding technical data. 
DOD has concurred with these recommendations but has not implemented 
hem. 
2. GAO report 10–833, entitled Opportunities Exist to Increase Competition and 
 Assess Reasons When Only One Offer Is Received (Findings are directly quoted, 
 in a through f, below.) 
a. For 42 of 74 contracts-or 57 percent of the noncompetitive 
contracts in our sample, agencies determined, under FAR Subpart 6.3, that 
only one responsible contractor could meet the agency’s requirements. 
b. For services supporting DOD weapons programs, the 
government’s lack of access to proprietary technical data and a heavy 
reliance on specific contractors for expertise limit, or even preclude the 
possibility of, competition.  
c. For 27 of the 47 noncompetitive DOD contracts we reviewed, the 
government was unable to compete requirements due to a lack of access to 
proprietary technical data. This situation, combined with a heavy reliance 
on certain contractors’ expertise built over years of experience, inhibits 
competition. Most of the contracting and program officials at DOD that 
we spoke with pointed to the lack of access to technical data as one of the 
main barriers to competition. Some contracting officers described this 
condition as essentially being “stuck” with a certain contractor.  
d. Several officials tout that the situation the government is currently 
experiencing is a result of decisions made years ago, when first acquiring 
a weapon system, to not purchase critical technical data packages for 
reasons that include budgetary constraints or a push toward streamlined 
contracting processes by purchasing commercial items. 
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e. Even when technical data are not an issue, the government may 
have little choice other than to rely on the contractors that were the 
original equipment manufacturers, and who, in some cases, designed and 
developed the weapon system. A few contracting and program officials we 
spoke with noted that for some DOD programs, the government is so 
reliant on the contractor that it is difficult for the government to even 
make decisions or set requirements anymore. 
f. Program offices can influence levels of competition through their 
roles in the acquisition planning process, in particular by having sufficient 
knowledge of the contract award process and providing contracting 
officials with enough time to compete requirements. However, in their 
competition reports, some agencies in our review pointed to a lack of 
acquisition planning, and the role that the program office plays in it, as a 
barrier to competition.  
3. GAO report 11–469, entitled DOD Should Clarify Requirements for Assessing 
 and Documenting Technical-Data Needs (Findings are directly quoted, in a 
 through f, below.) 
a. DOD took a series of actions to change its acquisition and 
procurement policies in a manner that reflects the language of the 2007 act 
and our 2006 recommendations. As a result of these changes, program 
managers are now required to record their long-term technical data needs 
in two key acquisition program documents: the acquisition strategy and 
acquisition plan. 
b. The documentation we reviewed for 12 acquisition programs 
partially addressed the revised DOD policies on long-term technical data 
needs.  
c. As a part of our review, we did not consider the amount or level of 
quality of the information that the acquisition strategies and acquisition 
plans included in response to each requirement because DOD’s policies 
did not specify the minimum levels or types of information that program 
officials are required to include to satisfy each of the four requirements. 
d. OSD and each military department have issued several guides for 
program managers that elaborate on the requirements in DOD policy for 
conducting and documenting assessments of long-term technical-data 
needs. From December 2009 through December 2010, DOD and the 
military departments issued guides covering voluntary actions that 
program managers might take to improve their decisions related to 
technical data. While officials in DOD and the military departments told 
us that program officials have found the various DOD-wide and military 
department-specific guides useful, program managers are not required to 
follow any of the recommendations contained in the guides. 
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e. OSD requires a business-case analysis for technical data decisions, 
but has not issued instructions on how to conduct the analysis. 
f. Previous GAO review found business case analyses were 
inconsistently completed. 
The above list of GAO findings illustrates some of the issues behind the DOD’s 
reported problems with competitive acquisition. However, the key finding as they pertain 
to this project, was made in GAO report 10–833 where they concluded 27 out of 47 
noncompetitive contracts were issued because the government lacked the appropriate 
technical data rights to issue competitive contracts. To further validate this finding, this 
project will conduct an identical auditing exercise to determine on its own whether or not 
TACOM’s 2012 competitive spending was affected in a similar manner.  
C. PERTINENT TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions are presented in order for one to fully understand a 
discussion on the DOD technical data rights policy.  
a) Technical Data according to the DOD 5010.12-M entitled Procedures for 
the Acquisition and Management of Technical Data (p. 11, May 1993), the 
definition of data “means recorded information of a technical or scientific 
nature. The term does not include computer or software or data incidental 
to contract administration such as financial or management information.”  
b) Technical Data Package according to the DOD 5010.12-M (p. 11, May 
1993), a Technical Data Package is described as “a technical description 
of an item adequate for supporting an acquisition strategy, which defines 
the required design configuration and procedures to ensure adequacy of 
item performance. It consists of all applicable technical data such as 
drawings, associated lists, specifications, standards, performance 
requirements, QA provisions, and packaging details.”  
c) Technical Data Rights according to the Defense Acquisition University 
ACQuipedia website, data rights are considered a shorthand way to refer 
to the Government’s license rights in two major categories of intellectual 
property. The two major categories consist of technical data and computer 
software. Within in these categories, the following level of rights exist:  
d) Unlimited Rights generally pertains to data developed exclusively at 
Government expense, and certain types of data (e.g., Form, Fit, and 
Function data [FFF]; Operation, Maintenance, Installation, and Training 
[OMIT]). These rights involve the right to use, modify, reproduce, display, 
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release, or disclose technical data in whole or in part, in any manner, and 
for any purpose whatsoever, and to have or authorize others to do so.  
e) Government Purpose License Rights involves the right to use, duplicate, 
or disclose technical data for Government purposes only, and to have or 
permit others to do so for Government purposes only. Government 
purposes include competitive procurement, but do not include the right to 
permit others to use the data for commercial purposes.  
f) Limited Rights permits the Government to use proprietary technical data 
in whole or in part. It also means that the Government has the expressed 
permission of the party providing the technical data to release it, or 
disclose it, outside the Government.  
g) Restricted Rights generally apply to data developed exclusively at private 
expense. 
h) Negotiated License Rights pertains whenever the standard license 
arrangements are modified to the mutual agreement of the contractor and 
the Government. In this case, the exact terms are spelled out in a specific 
license agreement unique to each application.  
i) Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Data Rights pertains to all 
technical data or computer software generated under an SBIR contract. 
Non-Government users cannot release or disclose outside the Government, 
except to Government support contractors. 
Commercial technical data license rights applies to technical data related to 
commercial items (developed at private expense) and managed in the same manner as 
limited rights. 
1. DOD’S Technical Data Rights Policy: A History 
According to Ralph C. Nash and Leonard Rawicz, the authors of the book entitled 
Technical Data Rights, the first regulatory technical data coverage appeared in 1955, in a 
provision entitled “Technical Data in Research Development Contracts” contained in the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). Furthermore, Nash and Rawicz state 
that the provision prescribed the use of a clause entitled “Reproduction and Use of 
Technical Data” which reads as follows:   
The Contractor agrees to and does hereby grant to the Government, to the 
full extent of the Contractor’s right to do so without payment of 
compensation to others, the right to reproduce, use, and disclose for 
Governmental purposes (including the right to give to foreign 
governments for their use as the national interest of the United States may 
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demand) all or any part of the reports, drawings, blueprints, data, and 
technical information specified to be delivered by the Contractor to the 
Government under this contract; provided, however, that nothing 
contained in this paragraph shall be deemed, directly or by implication, to 
grant any license under any patent now or hereafter issued or to grant any 
right to reproduce anything else called for by this contract. (Nash and 
Rawicz, 2001, p. 10) 
As one can see, the DOD’s initial policy pertaining to technical data rights 
provided no provision for protecting a contractor’s proprietary information delivered 
under the contract. The only limitation provided by the clause pertained to the 
government’s reproduction, use or disclosure of the data, which was to be submitted for 
governmental purposes only. However, according to Nash and Rawicz (p. 4, I.A.1) the 
government even ignored this subtle limitation by releasing data for any purpose, which 
benefited the government’s ability to competitively acquire items. Nash and Rawicz 
continue to describe that this practice resulted in many contractor complaints and 
ultimately caused the DOD to develop a new policy in 1958, and that the new policy 
“attempted to encourage inventiveness and provide incentives by honoring proprietary 
data, limiting data requirements to that data which was necessary to satisfy the intended 
use, and treating contractors and subcontractors alike as to the data delivered to the 
Government” (p. 5, I.A.3). The DOD issued additional policies on technical data in 1964 
and 1974. However, in 1984, Congress had to address the DOD’s adopted policies after 
industry advocated a need to preserve their proprietary rights. Congress responded by 
passing the Defense Procurement Reform Act which specified requirements both as to 
technical data rights and technical data acquisition by DOD agencies (Nash & Rawicz, p. 
11, I.A.6). These requirements were then codified in title 10 of the U.S. Code at sections 
2302, 2305, 2320 and 2321. This project will only examine the language found in U.S.C, 
Title 10, 2320 since it is the section that establishes the DOD’s general procurement 
requirements associated with technical data rights.   
E. THE PRIMARY PROCUREMENT DATA STATUTE 
As discussed above, Title 10 U.S.C., Section 2320 establishes the general 
procurement requirements associated with technical data rights, as it applies to the DOD. 
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Right from the onset, the language in this statute demonstrates its impact on the DOD by 
stating the following:  
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to define the 
legitimate interest of the United States and of a contractor or subcontractor 
in technical data pertaining to an item or process. Such regulations shall be 
included in regulations of the Department of Defense prescribed in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation. Such regulations may not impair any right 
of the United States or of any contractor or subcontractor with respect to 
patents or copyrights or any other right in technical data otherwise 
established by law. Such regulations also may not impair the right of a 
contractor or subcontractor to receive from a third party a fee or royalty 
for the use of technical data pertaining to an item or process developed 
exclusively at private expense by the contractor or subcontractor, except 
as otherwise specifically provided by law. 
This language is profound because 10 USC, Section 2320 specifically caused the 
DOD to establish regulations applicable to technical data rights, which the DOD did 
through the implementation of policy contained in both the FAR and DFARS. The 
language is also important because it establishes the government’s theme of treatment to 
both the government and the contractor. From the paragraph shown above, one can see 
that the government’s policy strives to protect the interest of the United States and the 
contractor. This language therefore caused a change to the DOD’s previous policy, and 
introduced a balanced approach whereby the government recognizes a contractor’s 
legitimate rights to data. The statute further implemented a method of communicating 
restrictions in data by allowing contractors to mark data with restricting legends. This 
right gave the contractor the new ability to restrict the government’s right from releasing 
or disclosing technical data pertaining to the item or process to persons outside the 
government or permit the use of the technical data by such persons. 10 USC, Section 
2320 further states the contractor retains this right except for data that: 
 Constitutes a correction or change to data furnished by the United States; 
 Relates to form, fit, or function; 
 Is necessary for operation, maintenance, installation, or training (other 
than detailed manufacturing or process data); or  
 Is otherwise publicly available or has been released or disclosed by the 
contractor or subcontractor without restriction on further release or 
disclosure. 
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However, notwithstanding the contractor’s new found ability to restrict the 
disclosure of such data, the statute did allow the government to retain a sovereign limited 
right for disclosure, but only under certain conditions. These conditions are outlined in 
paragraph (a)(2)(D) of 10 USC, Section 2320, which states the “data may be released to 
persons outside the Government, or the Government may permit the use of technical data 
by such persons, if: 
1. Such release, disclosure, or use— 
a. Necessary for emergency repair and overhaul; 
b. Necessary for the segregation of an item or process from, or the 
reintegration of that item or process (or a physically or functionally 
equivalent item or process) with, other items or processes; or 
c. Is a release or disclosure of technical data (other than detailed 
manufacturing or process data) to, or use of such data by, a foreign 
government that is in the interest of the United States and is 
required for evaluation or informational purposes; 
2. Such release, disclosure, or use is made subject to a prohibition that the 
person to whom the data is released or disclosed may not further release, 
disclose, or use such data; and 
3. The contractor or subcontractor asserting the restriction is notified of such 
release, disclosure, or use.” 
Subsequently, the statute also discusses the rights of the parties in other situations. 
One situation is when an item or process is developed by a contractor or subcontractor 
exclusively with federal funds. In this situation, the government obtains unlimited rights 
to use technical data pertaining to the item or process; or release or disclose the technical 
data to persons outside the government or permit the use of the technical data by such 
persons. Another situation is when an item or process is developed in part with federal 
funds and in part at private expense. In this case, the statute says the parties will establish 
the respective rights to the item or process “as early in the acquisition process as 
practicable (preferably during contract negotiations)” (10 USC, Section 2320 (a)(2)(E)). 
No matter, in either one of these situations, the government is able to obtain the level of 
rights (i.e., unlimited or government purpose) needed to facilitate a competitive 
acquisition for the same item. All other levels of rights obtained (i.e., limited or specially 
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negotiated) do not allow the government to disclose the data needed when soliciting 
competitive offers.  
F. THE DODI 5000.02: IMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE 
The government implements the requirements of a law in many ways. In this 
particular case, some of the requirements found in 10 U.S.C., Section 2320 are addressed 
in the DODI 5000.02. To be specific, paragraph (e) of the statute requires:  
The Secretary of Defense shall require program managers for major 
weapons systems and subsystems of major weapon systems to assess the 
long-term technical data needs of such systems and subsystems and 
establish corresponding acquisition strategies that provide for technical 
data rights needed to sustain such systems and subsystems over their life 
cycle. Such strategies may include the development of maintenance 
capabilities within the Department of Defense or competition for contracts 
for sustainment of such systems or subsystems. Assessments and 
corresponding acquisition strategies developed under this section with 
respect to a weapon system shall—  
(i) Be developed before issuance of a contract solicitation for the 
weapon system or subsystem; 
(ii) Address the merits of including a priced contract option for the 
future delivery of technical data that were not acquired upon initial 
contract award: 
(iii) Address the potential for changes in the sustainment plan over the 
life cycle of the weapon system or subsystem; and 
(iv) Apply to weapon systems and subsystems that are to be supported 
by performance-based logistics arrangements as well as to weapon 
systems and subsystems that are to be supported by other sustainment 
approaches.  
To address these requirements, per Enclosure 12, paragraph 9 of the DODI 
5000.02, the PM is required to “determine the data needs of the program (including 
external obligations) and develop a long-term strategy that integrates data requirements 
across all functional disciplines.” For ACAT I and II programs, PMs are required to 
incorporate the results of their assessment into the program’s data management strategy 
(DMS). Therefore, DMS should assess the data required to design, manufacture, and 
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sustain, as well as to support re-competition for production, sustainment, or upgrades in 
accordance with the PM’s strategy. In addition, the DMS needs to address the merits of 
including a contract option for the future delivery of technical data and intellectual 
property rights not acquired upon initial contract award. The contractor’s responsibility 
for verifying any assertion of restricted use and release of data should be addressed as 
well. Ultimately, the DMS is approved in the context of the Acquisition Strategy, which 
defines the acquisition, management, and rights of the data desired by the PM. 
Subsequently, the contents of the acquisition strategy are used as reference points during 
the acquisition planning and contracting phased of the acquisition cycle (DODI 5000.02).  
In addition to the DMS, the DODI 5000.02 also requires the PM to produce a 
technical data rights strategy (TDS) prior to each milestone review. This document is also 
important from an acquisition strategy perspective because it must demonstrate what the 
PM’s data acquisition strategy is, as it relates to certain acquisition objectives. As an 
example, the TDS is required to address what data acquisition strategies the PM will 
employ to “give small business the maximum practical opportunity to participate” (DODI 
5000.02, Paragraph 8). In order to demonstrate this requirement, the PM would describe 
its data acquisition efforts, which is defined as “all activities that create, obtain, or access 
data from internal or external sources to satisfy data requirements driven by the data 
strategy (DODI 5000.02, Section 4.2.3.1.7.1). This statement is especially important to 
understand from a strategy perspective, because the PM may achieve its desired 
acquisition and sustainment outcomes without having to take ownership of the technical 
data at hand. In fact, the DODI 5000.02 states that “the decision to purchase data should 
be carefully examined…,” and that the PM and chief systems engineer are responsible for 
working with the PM’s logistic lead to establish life cycle data requirements. All of this 
information would be contained in the TDS.  
G. THE DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
SUPPLEMENT—IMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE  
As mentioned above, the passage of 10 U.S.C. Section 2320 by Congress in 1984 
caused the DOD to formally establish its technical data policy. Progress towards fulfilling 
the requirements of this statute began to occur in 1987 when the FAR published its policy 
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on technical data rights, applying to both the government and contractors in the data 
prepared or used by contractors during contract performance. However, while this event 
marked an achievement in terms of fulfilling the statute, the FAR policy recognized that 
DOD had to create its own policy in the DFARS in order for it to address unique 
technical data challenges. Subsequent to the FAR policy, the DOD satisfied the 
requirements of the statute and addressed its technical data nuances by publishing two 
DFARS policies on the matter in 1988. One policy pertained to the rights in technical 
data, while the other policy pertained to rights associated with computer software. These 
original DOD policies, although they have since been changed by revisions to the 
DFARS, still constitute the foundation of the DOD’s policy today.  
H. THE DFARS POLICY 
The DOD policy pertaining to technical data rights was established and is still 
located in DFARS Subpart 227.71. According to DFARS Section 227.7100 (a), “This 
subpart prescribes policies and procedures for the acquisition of technical data and the 
rights to use, modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose technical data.” 
However, for the purpose of this paper, a focus was placed specifically on DFARS 
Subsection 227.7103–1 which describes the policies and procedures applicable to 
noncommercial items or processes. As outlined in this subpart, the DOD’s policy for 
noncommercial items consists of seven main elements. The initial element establishes 
DOD’s overarching technical data acquisition objective which states that the DOD “is to 
acquire only the technical data, and the rights in that data, necessary to satisfy agency 
needs.” This is important to note, because despite the belief of many, the DODs policy 
isn’t to acquire or otherwise assume ownership of all data. Instead, the DOD is to 
selectively acquire the data only needed to full-fill the agency’s needs, which are 
determined by the program manager when the acquisition relates to a major weapon 
system program. This responsibility is established in DFARS Subsection 227.7103–
2(b)(1), where it states that the program manager will determine the data needs while 
taking the following thoughts into consideration:  
Data managers or other requirements personnel are responsible for 
identifying the Government’s minimum needs for technical data. Data 
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needs must be established giving consideration to the contractor’s 
economic interests in data pertaining to items, components, or processes 
that have been developed at private expense; the Government’s costs to 
acquire, maintain, store, retrieve, and protect the data; reprocurement 
needs; repair, maintenance and overhaul philosophies; spare and repair 
part considerations; and whether procurement of the items, components, or 
processes can be accomplished on a form, fit, or function basis. When it is 
anticipated that the Government will obtain unlimited or Government 
purpose rights in technical data that will be required for competitive spare 
or repair parts procurements, such data should be identified as deliverable 
data items. Reprocurement needs may not be a sufficient reason to acquire 
detailed manufacturing or process data when items or components can be 
acquired using performance specifications, form, fit and function data, or 
when there are a sufficient number of alternate sources which can 
reasonably be expected to provide such items on a performance 
specification or form, fit, or function basis.  
In addition to establishing the overarching acquisition objective, DFARS 
Subsection 227.7103–1 also prescribes important policies directly applicable to format 
and content of contracting documents. This policy is especially important to highlight 
because most of the government’s rights to data are acquired as a result of contract 
performance. Therefore, the DOD has paid special attention to this fact by outlining in 
DFARS Subsection 227.7103–1(b) mandatory solicitation and contract contents. These 
mandatory contract requirements aim to ensure that the right data is delivered, and the 
appropriate data rights license is negotiated. In accordance with DFARS Subsection 
227.7103–1, the mandatory solicitation and contract requirements prescribed by the 
DOD’s policy are as follows:  
 Specify the technical data to be delivered under a contract and delivery 
schedule for the data: 
 Establish or reference procedures for determining acceptability of 
technical data; 
 Establish separate contract line items, to the extent practicable, for the 
technical data to be delivered under a contract and require offerors and 
contractors to price separately each deliverable data item; and  
 Require offerors to identify, to the extent practicable, technical data to be 
furnished with restrictions on the Government’s rights and require 
contractor’s to identify technical data to be delivered with such restrictions 
prior to delivery. 
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Another element of the DOD’s policy worth highlighting is found in DFARS 
Subsection 227.7103–1(c). This entry in the policy serves to satisfy a critical element of 
the statute whereby no offeror shall be required to sell or relinquish its rights to data in 
order to be determined responsive to a solicitation or as a condition for award. It is 
important to note this statute requirement because the government could cause a change 
to its current ability to obtain data rights by simply changing this portion of the law. 
However, discussing the pros and cons of this change is outside the scope of this project. 
No matter, this portion of the DOD policy, as born from statute, assures the respect of 
interest in rights that all contractors normally have.  
I. THE DFARS - STANDARD CONTRACT CLAUSES 
There are five primary DFARS clauses that help to implement the DOD’s 
technical data policy associated with noncommercial items or processes policy. The first 
clause to be discussed is DFARS Subsection 252.227–7013, Rights in Technical Data-
Noncommercial Items. This clause is mandatory for use in all solicitations and contracts 
when the contractor will be required to deliver data to the government, pertaining to 
noncommercial items or processes, or commercial items for which the government will 
have paid a portion of the development. This clause is very important because it provides 
key definitions relative to technical data and establishes what types of data the rights 
apply. It also establishes: the period during which the government shall have rights; the 
fact that the government generally obtains rights previously obtained for data to be 
delivered under a new contract; a release of liability for any release or disclosure of 
technical data made in accordance with the clause; that the contractor must mark all data 
it restricts with the appropriate assertion markings and be prepared to provide supporting 
assertion data to the contracting officer during his or her evaluation, and; that the 
contractor shall flow down the requirements of the clauses to its subcontractors. 
Ultimately, this clause is perhaps the most profound technical data clause because it 
broadly implements the DOD’s noncommercial technical data policies.  
The second clause to be discussed is DFARS Subsection 252.227–7017, 
Identification and Assertion of Use, Release, or Disclosure Restrictions. This clause 
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notifies the contractor that it must identify, to the extent known at the time and offer is 
submitted to the government, the data to be furnished with restrictions on use, release, or 
disclosure. The assertions of the contractor or subcontractor’s data must then be 
identified and provided in prescribed form on a proposal attachment.  
The third clause to be discussed is DFARS Subsection 252.227–7028, Technical 
Data or Computer Software Previously Delivered to the Government. According to the 
DFARS, this clause is to be inserted in solicitations when the resulting contract will 
require the contractor to deliver technical data. This clause requires the offeror to identify 
any deliverable item that is the same or similar to an item previously delivered or to be 
delivered under any federal contract. By inserting this clause and requiring the contractor 
to respond, the contracting officer is able to ensure by the faith of the contractor that the 
government’s pre-established rights to the data will be acquired under the prospective 
contract. Also, by identifying the data items, the government may be able to obtain 
previously delivered data from government sources in lieu of paying resubmission costs.  
The fourth clause to be discussed is DFARS Subsection 252.227–7030, Technical 
Data-Withholding of Payment. This clause essentially establishes the government’s right 
to withhold payment of 10 percent of the total contract price or a lesser specified contract 
amount if the contractor fails to deliver technical data in accordance with the terms of the 
contract.  
The fifth clause to be discussed is DFARS Subsection 252.227–7037, Validation 
of Restrictive Markings on Technical Data. This clause establishes a process for the 
review and challenge of restrictive assertions applied to technical data by the contractor. 
In defense of such challenges by the government, the contractor or subcontractor is 
responsible at any tier for maintaining records sufficient to justify the validity of its 
markings. The clause also communicates that the Contracting Officer is responsible for 
issuing a final decision on any assertions challenge. If the Contracting Officer determines 
that the validity of the restrictive markings is not justified, then the contractor or 
subcontractor can appeal the decision to the Board of Contract Appeals or United States 
Claims Court.  
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J. SUMMARY 
Overall, the subject of technical data rights is a controversial one because both the 
government and the contractor have an interest in technical data. The government’s 
interest arises from the fact that it procures millions of separate materiel items from 
industry, and is then required to operate and sustain those items. The data proves itself 
useful to the government in order to maintain a level of self-sufficiency, achieve social 
interest goals, and to capitalize on the benefits of competitive acquisition. The contractor, 
on the other hand, is in business to make money and can influence its ability to earn 
higher degrees of profit by developing unique technologies and retaining control of the 
associated data. Any unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of such trade secrets can 
negatively affect a contractor’s future returns on investments. In this sense, the 
government and the contractor’s motivations are at odds, which makes the matter of 
acquiring and enforcing data rights a challenging situation. However, until Congress 
changes its policy of maintaining a balanced approach, acquisition personnel must try to 
achieve higher levels of competition within the current policies.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter I of this project, the ACC-WRN fiscal year 2012 
contracting data was reviewed to determine if noncompetitive contracts were awarded 
based on being limited to a single source, or if a lack of access to competitive technical 
data rights had a significant impact on competition. ACC-WRN is located in Warren, 
Michigan, at the Detroit Arsenal—Tank Automotive and Armaments Command 
(TACOM), and is the contracting office responsible for acquiring goods and services on 
behalf of the tenant organizations located at TACOM. According to a briefing entitled 
“Army Contracting Command Overview” given to Major General Nichols on July 19, 
2012, by ACC-WRN Executive Director of Contracting Mr. Harry Hallock, the ACC-
WRN is comprised of 761 employees located amongst six geographic locations, and 
managed a total of $137 billion (bn) in contracts and obligated $14.3bn during fiscal year 
2012.  
The data presented and discussed throughout this chapter is limited to the ACC 
Warren site only, mainly because this portion of the command acquires a large amount of 
non-commercial items in comparison to the other locations. In addition, the items 
procured at this site are required to support the development, production, and sustainment 
of the Army’s ground vehicle fleet. Therefore, this site produces data that will help 
validate whether or not the lack of technical data rights impacts the DOD’s ability to 
acquire non-commercial items on a competitive basis throughout the acquisition life 
cycle. Some of the primary customers serviced and commodities procured by the ACC 






Table 1.   ACC Warren Primary Customers (from Hallock, 2012) 
FY12 Primary Customers Serviced 
PEO Ground Combat Systems PEO Ammo 
PEO Combat Support & Combat Service Support RDECOM, TARDEC/ARDEC 
PM System of Systems Integration PM Light Armored Vehicle 
Joint PEO Chemical Biological Defense TACOM Integrated Logistics Support Center 
PEO Soldier Foreign Military Sales 
Installation Management Activity Other Services (Marine Corp, Navy, Air Force) 
 
Table 2.   ACC Warren Commodities (from Hallock, 2012) 
FY12 Commodities Acquired 
Combat and Tactical Vehicles Concept and Research & Development Efforts 
Construction and Material Handling Equipment Small Arms & Targetry 
Fire Control Systems Chemical Defense Equipment 
Logistics and General Support Base Operation Support & Depot Maintenance 
Public/Private Partnerships Sets, Kits, Outfits & Tools 









B. FY12 COMPETITION RESULTS 
Chapter II, Section D.4 discussed the roles of the competition advocate of a 
procuring agency, and how his or her main responsibility is to promote full and open 
competition. CAs are required to prepare and submit an annual competition report to 
senior procurement executives of the agency. The following information was published in 
pp. 14–16 of the ACC-WRN report: 
TACOM LCMC is one of the Department of Defense’s major suppliers in 
the war effort  and our competition rate for any year will always be 
influenced by the mix  of systems that are being procured. Our Combat 
Vehicles - the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) including: Abrams, 
Bradley, M88, M113, M109, Armored Knight Family, and the Stryker 
Family of Vehicles are the largest group. These are clearly not commercial 
in nature and require enormous investments from facilities to 
manufacturing. Some of these are our legacy systems and they require 
upgrades and modifications to keep in sync with our newer systems. 
Although competed initially, the cost and time invested in setting up to 
manufacture and the continuous upgrade and modification to these 
vehicles make them very poor candidates for competition. When 
significant dollars are obligated for these vehicles, our competition rate 
tends to be low. Most, if not all, of the Tactical Systems were initially 
competed. The Tactical Vehicles are procured to a Performance 
Specification. For competition, this means that each offeror meets  the 
performance specification in a unique way.  
TACOM LCMC equipment continues to lead the war effort. As a result 
TACOM LCMC has had a number of urgent requirements which have 
been clearly documented through Joint Urgency of Need Statements 
(JUONS). The December FY12 FPDS-NG report listing for items with a 
system cost over $5.0M, non-competitive reflects that the non-competitive 
urgency requirements  over $5.0M equate to approximately $605.4M, 
which is an increase from last year. 
In spite of all of the unusual circumstances surrounding the TACOM 
LCMC acquisition process and the awarding of contracts by the Army 
Contracting Command-Warren, they have managed to compete 81.92% of 
the actions in the competition base and 40.01% of the dollars as of the 
FY12 yearend report. It should be noted that the competition base contains 
$724.5M that was not  available for competition. This issue has previously 
been elevated as a point of concern for gathering competition statistics by 
a number of agencies to include TACOM LCMC. The bulk of the non-
competitive awards were for vehicles and hardware where the 
Government did not own the Technical Data Package. 
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While the initial buy of a vehicle can be fully competitive, any subsequent 
buys must be evaluated in terms of the cost of introducing a completely 
different vehicle. Support of  Operations Enduring Freedom, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn and the Overseas Contingency 
Operations required us to provide many items in such a short timeframe 
that competition was not possible. This included the RESET of our 
vehicles, new  production vehicles and major components, and other 
upgrades and overhauls. It takes several years to plan and execute a 
competitive effort for a major system and when we were in a wartime 
scenario our primary goal was to meet the needs of the Warfighter and 
satisfy the urgent requirements. (ACC-WRN Report, 2012, pp. 14-16) 
The TACOM CMO went on to discuss some of the efforts their office has done 
recently to assist TACOM LCMC in meeting and exceeding its competition goals. The 
CMO has asked to be consulted early in the planning stages of programs as the various 
acquisition strategy options and acquisition plans are being discussed and decided upon. 
The CMO also initiated training to new TACOM acquisition employees on the role of the 
competition advocate, the importance of the J&A process and market research, and the 
CMO’s overall responsibilities it must exercise to assist ACC-WRN in meeting its 
requirements. Another key focus of the TACOM CMO is on its Source Approval 
Program, which is almost entirely generated by active market research, which per the 
report “is one of the keys to effective competition.” Cost savings for the taxpayer and an 
increase in TACOM LCMC’s overall ability to support the warfighter are achieved when 
additional contractors become approved sources of supply through this program.  
The ACC-WRN report states that the ACC Warren location executed $3.745bn on 
a competitive basis (38.63 percent) and $9.694bn on a noncompetitive basis (61.37 
percent). A complete breakdown of the ACC-WRNs competition results is provided in 
Table 3. It should be noted that the data shown in Table 3 is not commodity specific. In 
other words, the percentage of dollars competed shown does not take into account what 





Table 3.   ACC-WRN FY12 Competition Results  
(from TACOM CMO, 2012, p. 1) 
   $s COMPETED  BASE $s  % COMPETED 
Warren  $3,744.9 $9,694.4 38.63% 
Red River $210.7 $235.7 89.39% 
Anniston $36.5 $143.8      25.35% 
Sierra $17.4 $33.3 52.06% 
Watervliet $50.9 $67.0 75.95% 
Joint Manufacturing & 
Technology Center $51.3 $102.9 49.87% 
Total for TACOM $4,111.7 10,277.1 40.01% 
Total for TACOM excluding Not 
available for competition (Source 
directed FMS, 8A, etc) $4,111.7 $9,552.6 43.04% 
 
The TACOM Life Cycle Management Command competition goal for FY12, as 
set forth by the TACOM CMO and in conjunction with its customers, was 30 percent 
without foreign military sales (FMS). In spite of the need to make many awards 
expeditiously to support the war effort, ACC-WRN attained a Competition Performance 
Rate of 40.01 percent with FMS and 43.4 percent without FMS. Per the data provided in 
the report, TACOM LCMC exceeded its goal by over 10 percent.  
The ACC-WRN report also showed that the actual rate of competition steadily 
increased from fiscal year 2007 to 2012 on average. As depicted in the yellow portion of 
the bar graph in Table 4, the rate of competition for ACC-WRN in fiscal year 2007 was 








Table 4.   FY 12 Competition Performance Percentages of Total TACOM 
Dollars (from TACOM CMO, 2012, p. 2) 
 
 
Subsequently, as shown in Table 5, the quantity of justifications for other than full 
and open competition processed at ACC-WRN decreased from 584 to 214, or 63.36 
percent, during the same time period from 2007 to 2012.  
Table 5.   Number of J&As for FY06 to FY12  





As identified in Chapter II, Section B, of this project report, there are seven 
statutory circumstances that permit other than full and open competition. Table 6 
provides a summary of the competition rate of contracts actions awarded by TACOM in 
FY12. The table shows that over 50 percent of the non-competed actions cited “Only one 
responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy the agency requirements” 
as the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition. This 
information is shown in the “Details of Other Than Full and Open Competition” portion 
of Table 6, under the “Only One Source—Other” category.  
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Table 6.   FY12 Competition Summary (from TACOM CMO, 2012, competition summary worksheet tab)  
AMC ACC ACC-WRN N/A USA-ACC-WRN- DETROIT ARSENAL W56HZV  
                
Competition Actions 
% 
Actions Dollars % Dollars 
Competition Base 25147  $9,694,367,511  
Competed 20968 83.38% $3,744,920,117 38.63%
Not Competed 2972 11.82% $5,343,026,172 55.11%
Follow On to Competed 8 0.04% ($502,069) -0.01%
Not Available for Competition 1199 N/A $606,923,291 N/A
Not Included in Competition Report (null value) 0 N/A $0 N/A
Eligible Fair Opportunity/Limited Sources Actions 
% 
Actions Dollars % Dollars 
Fair Opportunity Given 632 56% $1,060,478,942 73%
Statutory Exception to Fair Opportunity 491 44% $395,826,000 27%
TOTAL Eligible Fair Opportunity/Limited Sources 1123  $1,456,304,942  
Statutory Exception to Fair Opportunity Actions 
% 
Actions Dollars % Dollars 
Minimum Guarantee 24 2.14% ($883,422) -0.06%
Only One Source 234 20.84% $259,333,089 17.81%
Urgency 8 0.71% $24,055,816 1.65%
Follow-on DO Following Comp Initial Order 191 17.01% $102,700,290 7.05%
Other Statutory Authority 34 3.03% $10,620,227 0.73%
TOTAL EXCEPTION TO FAIR OPPORTUNITY 491  $395,826,000  
Details of Competed Actions Actions % Actions Dollars % Dollars 
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COMPETED UNDER SAP 5,028 19.99% $38,797,816 0.40%
FOLLOW ON TO COMPETED ACTION 8 0.03% $-502,069 -0.01%
FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION 15,269 60.72% $3,454,849,152 35.64%
FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION AFTER 
EXCLUSION OF SOURCES 671 2.67% $251,273,148 2.59%
NOT AVAILABLE FOR COMPETITION 1,199 4.77% $606,923,291 6.26%
NOT COMPETED 2,822 11.22% $5,337,049,285 55.05%
NOT COMPETED UNDER SAP 150 0.60% $5,976,887 0.06%
TOTAL COMPETED ACTIONS 25,147   $9,694,367,511   
Details of Other Than Full and Open Competition Actions % Actions Dollars % Dollars 
AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE 160 3.77% $45,728,489 0.77%
BRAND NAME DESCRIPTION 13 0.31% $215,432 0.00%
FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT 48 1.13% $-74,147,844 -1.25%
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 1,067 25.16% $562,394,249 9.45%
MOBILIZATION, ESSENTIAL R&AMP;D 7 0.17% $-131,066 0.00%
NATIONAL SECURITY 5 0.12% $2,417,759 0.04%
ONLY ONE SOURCE – OTHER 2,245 52.94% $3,106,704,352 52.21%
SAP NON-COMPETITION 122 2.88% $4,777,440 0.08%
STANDARDIZATION 2 0.05% $189,108 0.00%
UNIQUE SOURCE 472 11.13% $1,700,352,388 28.57%
UNSOLICITED RESEARCH PROPOSAL 4 0.09% $4,110,900 0.07%
URGENCY 96 2.26% $598,315,022 10.05%
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FAR Subsection 6.302–1 discusses when the authority of “Only one responsible 
source” should be used by listing the following examples (not all inclusive) of situations 
where it may be appropriate:  
1) When there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the agency’s minimum 
needs can only be satisfied by unique supplies or services available from 
only one source or only one supplier with unique capabilities. 
2) The existence of limited rights in data, patent rights, copyrights, or secret 
processes; the control of basic raw material; or similar circumstances, 
make the supplies and services available from only one source (however, 
the mere existence of such rights or circumstances does not in and of itself 
justify the use of these authorities). 
3) When acquiring utility services, circumstances may dictate that only one 
supplier can furnish the service; or when the contemplated contract is for 
construction of a part of a utility system and the utility company itself is 
the only source available to work on the system. 
4) When the agency head has determined in accordance with the agency’s 
standardization program that only specified makes and models of technical 
equipment and parts will satisfy the agency’s needs for additional units or 
replacement items, and only one source is available. 
The second example above, the existence of limited rights in data, patent rights, 
copyrights, or secret processes, is the key situation under the “Only One Responsible 
Source” authority and is the focus of the remaining data analysis conducted and 
summarized in this chapter. It is important to note that Technical Data, as discussed in 
Chapter III, Section C, is not just limited to engineering drawings but includes all 
“recorded information regardless of the form or method of recording.” This is significant 
because in the authors’ experience, there is a general misconception that if the 
government has unlimited rights to drawings for a given system, that this in itself creates 
the ability to openly compete with little risk involved. However, the J&As researched 
under the next section of this chapter show that the “how to build” aspect of producing 
parts is not always detailed on a fully competitive drawing, and most of time contractors 
create proprietary process sheets that provide the necessary detail on how to manufacture 
an item. 
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C. CONTRACT FILE FINDINGS 
Chapter II, Part B, of this project discussed DOD’s requirement to follow statute 
(CICA) when acquiring goods and services. CICA authorizes under certain conditions to 
contract without providing for full and open competition. A J&A is required to justify 
and obtain appropriate approvals to contract without providing for full and open 
competition as specified by the FAR. In an effort to identify the significance of the lack 
of technical data as a reason for awarding noncompetitive contracts at TACOM, relevant 
contracts were identified from the “Not Competed Actions” tab of the spreadsheet 
entitled FY2012 Competition Report – Detroit Arsenal, which provided a listing of all 
non-competed contracts awarded by TACOM in FY12. This analysis only took into 
account the high dollar value, non-competed FY12 contract actions and did not include 
other low dollar contract instruments such as purchase orders, delivery orders, and GSA 
orders. The rationale for this approach is because TACOM primarily handles higher 
dollar contract actions.  
J&As were obtained and reviewed for the “top ten” dollar value, non-competed 
contract actions awarded by the ACC Warren site in FY12. Out of the J&As reviewed, 
seven out of 10 (or 70 percent) cited lack of technical data rights as a key reason for not 
being able to compete. The total dollar value for all related FY 12 sole source contracts at 
TACOM was $1.21bn. The total dollar value for the top ten sole source contracts that 
were looked at was $765 million, which is 63 percent of the total $1.21bn awarded. The 
high percentages of 70 percent and 63 percent, respectively, show that a lack of technical 
data is a barrier to competition for TACOM and contributed to a high percentage of the 
total non-competed actions at the ACC Warren site in FY12. In the three J&As that did 
not list a lack of technical data as a key reason for awarding a sole source contract, an 
“unusual and compelling urgency” was cited as the authority for contracting without 
providing for full and open competition. It should be noted that this is a common 
authority used while at war, which was the case during FY12. 
Although the authors of this project are not authorized to disclose specific details 
of the J&As, some general information will be shared as being relevant to this analysis. 
In one case, a $58M contract was awarded sole source to upgrade a combat vehicle to a 
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later configuration. The J&A discusses how, while the government does own the rights to 
the TDP, it does not possess the process sheets needed to remanufacture vehicles to zero 
mile vehicles. It further states that the government requested that the contractor sell the 
process sheets to the government for the vehicle but the contractor formally declined. 
This portion of the J&A supports the information noted in the last paragraph of Section B 
of this chapter, which discusses that the “how to build” aspect of something is typically 
detailed in proprietary contractor process sheets versus drawings. 
In other examples, the J&As state that although the government does have 
unlimited rights to portions of the TDP, the system being procured has many critical parts 
in which the TDPs are source controlled with proprietary data controlled by the 
contractor. In one case, the J&A notes that almost all of the drawings that the government 
only has limited rights to fall into the category of critical. Critical drawings are required 
to perform the effort satisfactorily. At a subsystem level, having unlimited rights to a 
portion of the TDP would allow the government to compete some parts of that 
subsystem, which is helpful for spare part procurements. However, at the vehicle system 
level, the government would require unlimited rights to all of the technical data in order 
to allow for a full and open procurement strategy of the vehicle.  
A common theme is present in the J&As reviewed that referenced a lack of 
unlimited data rights by the government as a reason for not being able to competitively 
award the contract. Most of the J&As reviewed discussed how the government requested 
that the contractor provide a cost estimate for selling unlimited rights to the government 
for their data. In all these cases, the estimate the government received was either so high 
that procuring the data rights was far from being a cost effective approach, or the 
contractor refused to even provide an estimate whatsoever. This is not surprising as 
contractors, in an effort to look out for their shareholders, will only sell unlimited rights 
to the government if they believe it is in the best economic interests of their company. 
D. GAO FINDINGS 
Several findings from GAO report 10–833, in which separate data analysis were 
conducted and summarized, were found to be relevant to this project. For example, the 
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report concluded that DOD’s lack of access to proprietary technical data and decades-
long reliance on specific contractors for expertise, limit or even preclude the possibility 
of competition. In 57 percent of the noncompetitive DOD contracts they reviewed, the 
government was unable to compete requirements due to a lack of access to proprietary 
technical data (Government Accountability Office, 2010). This situation, combined with 
a heavy reliance on certain contractors’ expertise built over years of experience, inhibits 
competition. Most of the contracting and program officials at DOD with whom GAO 
auditors spoke pointed to the lack of access to technical data as one of the main barriers 
to competition. Some contracting officers described this condition as essentially being 
“stuck” with a certain contractor. Several officials pointed out that the situation the 
government is currently experiencing “is a result of decisions made years ago” when first 
acquiring a weapon system, to not purchase critical technical data packages (TDPs) for 
reasons that included budgetary constraints or a push toward streamlined contracting 
processes by purchasing commercial items (Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
For a few of the contracts in the GAO sample, the government had purchased some of the 
technical data, but, for budgetary reasons, did not keep those data packages current over 
time. Hence, only the original equipment manufacturer had the technical data needed for 
follow-on maintenance and engineering support contracts. Some contracting and program 
officials have inquired about the cost of obtaining the technical data, only to discover that 
the package was not for sale or purchase of it would be cost-prohibitive, especially the 
systems and equipment that have been contracted out for decades (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). 
The GAO-10–833 report went on to state the following on the impact that 
technical data has on the ability to compete contracts within DOD, and recent steps that 
Congress has taken to address this issue: 
Even when technical data are not an issue, the government may have little 
choice other than to rely on the contractors that were the original 
equipment manufacturers, and who, in some cases, designed and 
developed the weapon system. A few contracting and program officials we 
spoke with noted that for some DOD programs, the government is so 
reliant on the contractor that it is difficult for the government to even 
make decisions or set requirements anymore. Our prior work has noted the 
48 
government’s increasing reliance on contractors and pointed to the 
challenges of this increasing reliance, such as identifying and 
distinguishing roles and responsibilities and ensuring appropriate 
oversight. Most non-competitive DOD contracts in our sample indicated 
that the contractor was the only source of the expertise for the system, 
having developed that expertise and the infrastructure over time.  
(Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 21) 
Recently, Congress has taken steps to address the lack of access to 
technical data. For example, the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007 required DOD program managers 
for major weapons systems to assess the long-term technical data needs 
and establish corresponding acquisition strategies that provide for the 
technical data rights needed to sustain such systems over their life cycle. 
Further, Congress enacted legislation in May of 2009 that requires  DOD 
to include in the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition 
program measures to ensure competition—or the option of competition—
at both the prime contract level and subcontract level throughout the life-
cycle of the program. This includes considering the acquisition of 
complete technical data packages, among other things. (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010, p. 20) 
Another issue, as referenced in the GAO-10–833 report, discussed how the 
overall value of data from the FPDS-NG database could be in question (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). FAR Section 4.602 discusses the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS), which provides a comprehensive web-based tool for agencies to report 
contract actions. The resulting data provides a means of measuring and assessing the 
effect of other policy and management initiatives (e.g., performance-based acquisitions 
and competition). It was discovered that the data itself in the FPDS-NG database is 
oftentimes not accurate due to incorrect reporting. Although GAO’s sample was not 
representative of all federal contract obligations, they found coding errors in FPDS-NG. 
Specifically, 19 of the 107 contracts and orders they reviewed, or about 18 percent, were 
coded incorrectly (Government Accountability Office, 2010). This would certainly skew 
the overall results reported from the system on the percentage of competed versus non-
competed contract actions. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The review of the ACC-WRN report, J&As from several FY12 ACC Warren site 
contracting actions, as well as GAO reports, helps shed light on the significant impact 
technical data rights have on competition in the federal acquisition process. Data from all 
three of these areas show that a lack of technical data rights can be a significant barrier to, 
and has a history of impeding, competition within DOD. The ensuing and final chapter to 
this project will offer conclusions, recommendations, and some suggestions for further 
research on the subject of technical data rights, in addition to providing the answers to the 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary and secondary research questions were addressed during 
the course of this project. Each question and a brief answer are provided below.  
1. Does the Government’s Lack of Technical Data Rights Associated 
with Hardware Items, Significantly Impact DOD’s Ability to 
Competitively Acquire Non-Commercial Items? 
The conclusion drawn in response to this question is based on the analysis 
presented in Chapter IV of this project. In this chapter, it was revealed through the data 
analyzed and the ACC-WRN report that 61.37 percent of the FY12 funds executed by the 
ACC-WRN were done so on a noncompetitive basis. Out of the noncompetitive actions 
issued, this project reviewed the J&As associated with the top ten dollar value new 
contract instruments issued during the year. From this sample, it was discovered that  
70 percent of the actions were issued on a sole source basis because of the government’s 
lack of access to technical data. The value of these actions constituted 63 percent of the 
total value of all actions issued on an “Other than Full and Open” basis where the J&A 
cited “only one responsible source” as the statutory exception. Consequently, the results 
of the analysis lead one to conclude that the lack of access to technical data did have a 
significant impact on the ACC-WRNs ability to make some of the high dollar value 
actions available for competition in 2012.  
2. Are There Obvious Changes that Can be Made to Key Statutes, 
Regulations or Other Polices Pertaining to Technical Data Acquisition 
That Would Likely Increase DOD’s Ability to Competitively Acquire 
Non-Commercial Items? 
The conclusion to this question was derived from the literature reviewed in 
Chapter III of this project. Based on the review of 10 U.S.C., Section 2320, one unlikely 
change that could be made is to require the contractor or subcontractor to relinquish its 
rights to the technical data of an item being bought by the government. Currently, 
paragraph (a)(2)(F) of the subject statute specifically states “A contractor or 
subcontractor (or a prospective contractor or subcontractor ) may not be required, as a 
52 
condition for award of a contract— (i) to sell or otherwise relinquish to the United States 
any rights in technical data... .” While implementing this change would surely make it 
easier for the DOD to acquire unrestricted technical data, it would also create negative 
impacts on the overall state of competition that would be undesirable to the government 
and its constituents. This conclusive statement can be said with relative confidence 
because the DOD and industry already experienced a period whereby a prospective 
contractor was required to forfeit its data rights as a condition for award of a contract. 
This technique and industry’s successful lobbying of Congress to abolish its use was 
discussed in Chapter III of this project. Therefore, while the DOD could press Congress 
to change the law back, the likelihood of this happening is considered to be very 
doubtful.  
Another change that could be made pertains to regulation and finding ways to 
better define the DOD’s overarching technical data acquisition objective. Currently, 
DFARS Subsection 227.7103–1 says the DOD’s objective “is to acquire only the 
technical data, and the rights in that data, necessary to satisfy agency needs.” Perhaps a 
potential issue with this objective is that the agencies needs are commonly established by 
the program manager in charge of a system when it is being developed, in lieu of a DOD 
board that’s charged with affecting long term data management strategies across the 
portfolio of Program Executive Office programs.  
3. What are the Major Laws, Orders, Guidance, and Regulations that 
Establish the Government’s Preference to Buy Items on a Competitive 
Basis?  
During the course of this project, many laws, orders, guidance, and regulations 
were reviewed, as pertaining to the government’s policy to buy items and services on a 
competitive basis. Some of the major statutory and policy documents that were examined 
included: 
 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) (S. 2127), which was first 
introduced in 1982 and later codified into United States Code, Title 10, 
Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 137, Section 2304 in 1984.  
 President Barack Obama 2009 letter issued to all government contracting 
personnel reminding them of their obligation to the American taxpayer. 
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 Better Buying Power memorandum issued by Dr. Ashton B. Carter, the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on  
June 28, 2010. A subsequent memorandum entitled “Better Buying Power: 
Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending,” issued on September 14, 2010, by Dr. Carter was also 
examined. These two pieces of guidance create an initiative aimed at 
increasing efficiency and productivity within the DOD, and it specifically 
aims at promoting real competition with the acquisition process.  
 Better Buying Power 2.0 memorandum issued by Mr. Frank Kendall, the 
current Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics on November 13, 2012. This memo was reviewed because it 
continues to reemphasize the BBP initiatives, as established by Dr. Carter. 
 FAR Section 1.102—Statement of Guiding Principles for the Federal 
Acquisition System. This section of the FAR establishes the vision for the 
Federal Acquisition System and establishes its tenets, which in part 
includes the promise that government acquisition employees will promote 
competition. 
 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Section 20 and FAR 
Section 6.501—Competition Advocates, which both establish the role of 
Competition Advocates who are responsible for promoting full and open 
competition for each procuring activity. 
 FAR Part 6Competition Requirements in general was examined, with 
specific references made to FAR Subsection 6.303–2, which outlines the 
requirements for permitting “Other Than Full and Open Competition.” 
 FAR Section 34.002—Major System Acquisition and FAR Subsection 
34.005–1 discusses the requirement for program managers to promote full 
and open competition and sustain effective competition throughout the 
acquisition life cycle.  
 DOD Directive 5000.01 was examined to understand the relationship and 
responsibility a program manager of an acquisition program has as it 
relates to competition.   
4. What Are the Rationale and Motives for Establishing a System that 
Emphasizes Competitive Contracting Procedures? 
The rationale and motives for establishing a system that emphasizes the use of 
competitive procedures to acquire goods and services were found in several of the 
documents examined as part of this project. The most recent rationale and motives were 
provided in the letter issued by President Barack Obama (reference Chapter II, paragraph 
A, last bullet) and the BBP letters issued by Dr. Carter and Mr. Frank Kendall (reference 
Abstract). In both cases, the president and the undersecretaries pinpoint competition as a 
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means for obtaining greater cost savings, contractor performance, and accountability for 
results on behalf of the taxpayer. The DODD 5000.01 (Chapter II, paragraph C, p. 18) 
also seems to support the same overarching benefits identified by the president and the 
undersecretaries because it also states that competition can provide major incentives to 
industry and government organizations to innovate, reduce cost, and increase quality. 
Lastly, the BBP letter issued on September 14, 2010, talks about how competition 
increases the participation among:  
small businesses that (sic) have repeatedly demonstrated their contribution 
to leading the nation in innovation and driving the economy by their 
example of hiring over 65 percent of all new jobs and holding more 
patents than all the nation’s universities and large corporations combined. 
(Cater, 2010, p. 10)  
5. What Are some of the Government’s Current Recommendations to 
Increase its Ability to Procure Items on a Competitive Basis?  
Based on the information reviewed during this project, a list of prospective policy 
or business practice recommendations were noted in the September 14, 2010, 
memorandum issued by Dr. Ashton Carter. The specific recommendations made by the 
undersecretary are summarized below:  
 Present a competitive strategy to the appropriate program acquisition 
executive (i.e. Defense Acquisition Executive or Component Acquisition 
Executive) at each program milestone.  
 Conduct negotiations with all single bid offerors and that the basis of 
negotiations shall be cost or price analysis, as the case may be, using non 
certified data.  
 Remove obstacles to competition by lessening the advantage of incumbent 
contractors during source selections by equalizing the evaluation factors 
so the technical factor cannot overshadow the past performance and cost 
factor. In addition, the need to identify and share potential requirements 
with industry in advance is stressed as means for increasing proposal 
responsiveness. 
 Require each competition advocate to develop a plan to improve both the 
overall rate of competition and the rate of effective competition. 
 Require open systems architectures and set rules for acquisition of 
technical data rights. Specifically a business case analysis must be 
presented at Milestone B to outline the approach for using open systems 
architectures and acquiring technical data rights to ensure sustained 
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consideration for competition in the acquisition of weapon systems is 
given. (Carter, A., 2010) 
6. What Type of Programs does the TACOM LCMC Employ to Affect 
Competition?  
Based on the information presented in ACC-WRN report, the TACOM LCMC 
uses the following practices and programs to affect competition within its acquisition 
processes:  
 The Competition Management Office attends all peer reviews conducted 
by the ACC-WRN. These reviews are conducted at a variety of points 
during the contracting cycle, which allows the Competition Advocate an 
opportunity to participate and help influence the competitive contracting 
strategy when possible. The Competition Advocate also plays a significant 
role in terms of reviewing and approving or concurring in J&As staffed at 
the command. Once again, this allows the Competition Advocate another 
opportunity to influence the contracting strategy prior to it being officially 
approved. Finally, the Competition Advocate facilitates the development 
of competition by gathering and publicizing prospective requirements 
from the organizations that reside at the TACOM LCMC. Examples of 
such efforts facilitated by the Competition Advocate’s Office include the 
Source Approval Program, Competition Advocate Shopping List, and 
Advance Planning Brief to Industry. 
 The Competition Advocate uses a mandatory buyer boot camp class as 
platform for providing training on market research to new buyers. It also 
partners with the local Small Business Office to find potential small 
businesses that are capable of performing prospective requirements. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the information presented in this project, TACOM’s acquisition 
community should consider adopting the following recommendation:    
1. Develop Commodity Specific Competition Expectations 
Recommendation 1: That the TACOM acquisition community begin 
tracking, pulling, and analyzing commodity fields for TACOM 
LCMC contracts awarded by ACC-WRN.  
One area of concern that has been recognized through the research conducted 
under this project is the apparent lack of commodity specific expectations related to 
DOD’s guidance on increasing competition. The data has shown that different levels of 
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competition should be expected depending on the nature of items being bought. In the 
guidance given to the acquisition community by senior DOD leadership, it just 
emphasizes the need to increase competition. However, the research has shown that the 
ability to compete a procurement is affected by many factors. Some of these factors 
include whether or not the commodity being bought is a product versus a service, a major 
system versus a small subsystem, and a new system versus a legacy system. The last 
factor was discussed on p. 15 of the ACC-WRN report, where it discusses legacy systems 
and how “although competed initially, the cost and time invested in setting up to 
manufacture and the continuous upgrade and modification to these vehicles make them 
very poor candidates for competition.” One recommendation is for the TACOM 
acquisition community to start tracking, pulling, and analyzing commodity fields for 
TACOM LCMC contracts awarded by ACC-WRN. If data can be assembled to show 
DOD leadership that expected competition levels are commodity dependent, more 
realistic and specific goals could be developed instead of having a blanket competition 
goal across the board.  
2. Offer Incentives to Government Personnel and Contractors 
To further create an acquisition environment that avails itself to the maximum 
amount of competitive contracting opportunities, TACOM should adopt the following 
recommendations:   
a. Incentives for Contractors 
Recommendation 2: That the TACOM acquisition community offer 
incentives to contractors within the contract solicitation aimed at 
increasing competition during the source selection process.  
In order for this to have an impact, incentives should be offered early on in a 
program’s life cycle, ideally during the source selection process. Competition could be 
used as an evaluation factor during the government’s review of contractor proposals. In 
order for this approach to be effective, the focus should be placed on non-complex, high 
replacement components within a vehicle system instead of major assemblies or the 
vehicle system itself. There are recent examples of the government, in vehicle proposal 
solicitations, requesting fully detailed Technical Data Packages for entire vehicle systems 
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that can be used for competition. As one can imagine, DOD contractors have been 
reluctant to provide vehicle-level TDPs with unlimited government data rights as it can 
prevent them from being awarded future contracts for that vehicle system. However, if 
during the solicitation process vehicle original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are 
incentivized to increase competition at the component level, they may be much more 
inclined to participate. It is well documented throughout DOD that the cost for sustaining 
a vehicle system throughout its life cycle is higher than both the costs for the initial 
development and production of a vehicle. Increasing competition for spare part 
procurements could significantly lower the costs for sustaining a vehicle over its life 
cycle. Incentivizing vehicle OEMs to develop competitive TDPs at the component level 
should not negatively impact their chances for being awarded future contracts for the 
vehicle system. This contracting approach could, however, prevent unreasonable spare 
part inflation costs over time and could help drive down the overall cost to support the 
vehicle over time.  
b. Incentives for Government Personnel 
Recommendation 3: That the TACOM LCMC begin offering 
monetary awards to employees that help increase competition and 
subsequently save cost to the taxpayer. 
As introduced in Chapter I, Section G, the ACC-WRN report was analyzed to 
determine what incentive programs and techniques, if any, were used to generate 
competition throughout TACOM. The report shows several cases where government 
employees were recognized for excellence by receiving various awards from Army 
acquisition leadership. While being recognized by leadership either at an individual or 
team level can be viewed as a form of incentive, it may be more effective to offer 
monetary awards for individuals that help increase competition and subsequently save 
cost to the taxpayer. DOD has established similar programs that offer monetary awards to 
government personnel that are involved with projects that help reduce programs costs. 
One example of this is the “Value Engineering” program. As defined in FAR Subpart 2.1, 
“Value engineering” (VE) means an analysis of the functions of a program, project, 
system, product, item of equipment, building, facility, service, or supply of an executive 
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agency, performed by qualified agency or contractor personnel, directed at improving 
performance, reliability, quality, safety, and life cycle costs. Successful VE projects yield 
reductions in program life cycle costs, and monetary awards are typically given to 
individuals involved with the project once the savings initiatives are implemented. It is 
the belief of the authors of this project that employees typically respond well to monetary 
incentives. Therefore, establishing a monetary award incentive program in the area of 
increasing competition could yield positive results. If acquisition professionals receive 
just a small portion of the savings from helping increase competition, this should 
incentivize them to always be looking for ways to help increase competition throughout a 
product’s life cycle.  
A monetary award incentive program would help increase the level of 
involvement from employees in PMs and PEOs, which in turn should increase 
competition opportunities overall. It appeared from the ACC-WRN report that the office 
primarily responsible for increasing competition at TACOM is the CMO. PM employees 
are the ones responsible for managing the day to day activities of a specific program, and 
therefore should be much more aware of and influential to any potential efforts for 
increasing competition on that program. A monetary award incentive program could 
ultimately help establish a grass roots-level approach, possibly a more effective venue for 
increasing competition throughout TACOM and other DOD procuring agencies.  
3. Perform Additional Research 
Recommendation 4: That the TACOM LCMC study Business Case 
Analyses (BCAs) conducted by programs it manages to assess the 
average cost comparisons between competitive versus noncompetitive 
contracting strategies. 
Further research and studies conducted on this subject could provide more 
answers on the topic of data rights and their effect on competition within the federal 
acquisition process. One particular area that could be studied is the cost comparisons 
from formal BCAs that looked at various programs’ life cycle costs with using a 
competitive versus noncompetitive contracting strategy. As presented in the Chapter 1 of 
this study, Dr. Carter’s 2010 BBP memorandum established a requirement for programs 
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of record to present a BCA at Milestone B, which would outline an approach for 
acquiring technical data rights to ensure sustained competition. Although a significant 
amount of guidance exists on the importance of increasing competition through the 
acquisition of data rights, an investigation of the cost comparisons generated from BCAs 
could help quantify any potential cost savings. A study such as this could identify the 
costs involved with the government purchasing unlimited data rights from a contractor at 
the beginning of a program’s life cycle as well as later on into a program’s life cycle, and 
could compare those costs to those associated with a sole source contracting strategy that 
is used throughout a program’s entire life cycle. An analysis of several BCAs showing 
the cost comparisons between competitive versus noncompetitive contracting strategies 
would identify, on a large scale, overall potential savings (if any) from the purchase of 
data rights and the subsequent ability to compete high dollar value contracts. 
Recommendation 5: That the TACOM LCMC conduct research to 
determine the validity and accuracy of the BCAs published by 
programs it manages. 
In addition to analyzing the return on investment results from BCAs, further 
research should be done on the validity and accuracy of the BCAs themselves. Chapter 3, 
Part B, noted one of GAOs findings from their 11–469 report entitled DOD Should 
Clarify Requirements for Assessing and Documenting Technical-Data Needs. The report 
noted that BCAs were often “inconsistently completed” (Government Accountability 
Office, 2011). There could be a colossal impact from this assessment. If BCAs are the 
main mechanism being used by DOD acquisition executives for deciding whether or not 
to purchase data rights for competitive procurements, thoroughness, accuracy, and 
uniformity of the information in the BCAs is critical. For major programs, millions and 
sometimes billions of taxpayer dollars can be at stake with these decisions. Therefore, a 
study on the completeness and consistency of BCAs throughout ACC-WRN, and 
specifically the TACOM LCMC, could identify potential shortfalls with the current 
guidance and requirements set forth by DOD leadership as it relates to determining the 
correct contracting strategy for major programs. 
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Recommendation 6: That DOD sponsor research to determine 
whether-or-not the tracking and establishment of commodity specific 
goals actually does occur within the department. 
A final recommendation for future study relates to the information presented in 
Part B.1 of this chapter. Research could be conducted to determine if the tracking and 
establishment of commodity specific goals actually does occur within some DOD 
procuring agencies. If it is determined that this is not being done at all within DOD, 
research into why the commands haven’t historically created various competition goals 
based on commodity averages could be explored. Overall, the findings from this study 
could help identify problems and offer solutions to the way DOD leadership has required 
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